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VENDOR'S OBLIGATION AS TO FITNESS OF LAND
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE*
ALLISON DUNHAM**
IN MAl cH of this year the real estate section of the New York
Sunday Times had in adjacent columns two stories about land con-
tracts and the fitness of the housing purchased: one was a report
of testimony before a subcommittee of the House Committee on
Banking and- Currency on the quality of new housing constructed
on Long Island under Veterans Administration (VA) and Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) plans;' the other was a report that
the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) was pro-
posing to its members that buyers of new housing be given a written
warranty of workmanship and quality of materials. 2 During this
same period the New York legislature had before it a bill to require
builders to post a bond to guaranty the workmanship and materials
in new housing. During the past year the English legal journals
have been concerned with the question whether, under the Town
*Reprinted from the Proceedings of the Meeting of the Section on Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association at San
Francisco, September 1952.
**Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1. N. Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1952, Sec. 8 p. 1, Col. 4. For the official re-
port of the hearings see, Hearings Before Subcominittee on Housing of the
Committee ont Banking and Currency on H. R. 436, 82 Cong., 2d Sess.
(1952).
2. N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1952, Sec. 8 p. 1, Col. 5. The proposed warranty
reads as follows:
This home meets the requirements of the applicable building code. It has
been inspected and approved by local building authorities.
The home upon delivery to the original purchaser was structurally
sound and free from defects in material and workmanship not common to
the grade and type of materials used in it.
For the original purchaser, we will replace or repair, free of cost, any
such defects which occur under ordinary use and care before.
or before resale by the original purchaser, whichever date is earlier. Such
defects must be brought to our attention in writing within that time. We do
not, of course, assume responsibility for 1) damage due to natural wear and
tear, 2) defects which are the result of characteristics common to the mate-
rials used, 3) loss or injury caused in any way by the elements, 4) condi-
tions resulting from condensation on, or expansion or contraction of,
materials.
This warranty is limited to the date stated in the preceding paragraph.
It is the only warranty made or authorized by us with respect to the above
home, and is in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied and of all
other obligations or liabilities on our part, whether with respect to material
or workmanship in the home, damage to the purchaser or others, or to his
or their effects, or otherwise. We make no warranty beyond the time above
stated, even though the claimed defect does not become apparent within
such time.
This warranty is solely for the protection of the original purchaser whose
signature appears below.
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and Country Planning Act and the standard land contract, a vendor
warranted the use or fitness of property sold. 3 The House subcom-
mittee later reported that the quality of Federal Housing Adminis-
tration (FHA) and the Veterans Administration (VA) housing
was not as bad as complaints had alleged; and the NAHB decided
to have a paper called a "policy" and not a "warranty" ;4 and the
New York legislature did not pass the bills imposing a mandatory
warranty of quality; and the English Law Society decided that
permitted use under the Town and Country Planning Act was not
a matter of vendor's obligation under a standard contract. Never-
theless this activity of a legal and non-legal nature concerning the
relation of vendor and purchaser suggested to me that we con-
veyancers ought to take a short recess from our preoccupation with
marketable title and laws designed to make title more certain and
take a look at a relatively neglected area of land law-a vendor's
obligations as to the quality and fitness of the land which he has
contracted to sell. We should do this because public concern of the
type evidence by the articles referred to usually foreshadows
3. Potter, Caz'cat Emptor or Conveyancing Under the Planning Acts,
13 (N.S.) Cony. & Prop. Lawyer 36 (1948); Cobby, Is the Permitted Use
a Matter of Title?, 13 (N.S.) Conv. & Prop. Lawyer 329 (1948). See also,
Potter, Conveyancing Under the Planning Act, (1950) J. Planning Law
247, 330.
4. The proposed "policy" reads:
HOME OWNER'S SERVICE POLICY
(1). We hope you will be happy in your NEW HOME. It has been
constructed in accordance with accepted home building practices. It has been
inspected by our trained personnel and, where required, by the building de-
partment of the municipality in which it is situated.
(2). As a matter of policy we will, upon written request to our office
at the address appearing on this Service Policy, made within 6 months from
the date of delivery to you of title to this Home (subject, however, to
Paragraph 4 below) inspect your home as promptly as possible; and, where
shown by such inspection to require adjustment by reason of defects in work-
manship or material, we will make reasonable and necessary repairs or
adjustments without cost to you.
(3). A Manual of Suggestions on the care and maintenance of your
New Home is given you with this Service Policy. Please read it carefully!
It will help you to understand the minor adjustments to most newly con-
structed homes necessary in their first few months. It will aid you in the
proper care of your Home so that its value may be preserved for a long
time. Specific reference is made in the Manual to the extent and duration of
such responsibility as manufacturers or others have for the work done or
equipment intalled by them.
(4). This Home Owner's Service Policy is non-transferable. Any
obligation under it terminates if the property is resold or shall cease to be
occupied by the Home Owner to whom it is originally issued.
(5). This Home Owner's Service Policy and accompanying Manual
conforms with the standard requirements of the National Association of'
Home Builders and its affiliated local association. As a condition of member-
ship in these Associations, we have pledged ourselves to build good homes




legal development of statutory or judge-made law.' We should
also review the law in this area because the post World War II
building boom saw a great increase in the industrialization of the
building industry6 and mass production of housing, and it was
this same movement toward mass production of goods a century ago
which produced the growth of the modern law of seller's obliga-
tions-as to quality in the sale of goods.7 The growth in sales law
was from caveat emptor toward attaching legal significance to
buyer reliance on seller's statements about his product and then
to a warranty imposed by reason of common understanding of the
bargain. It is the purpose of this paper to look at the legal con-
cepts which now impose a seller's obligation as to quality and
fitness and which may grow into rather firmly fixed obligations
similar to the sales law of warranties which the seller not the buyer
must contract out of.
Sales law and the law of land contract started at the same
place. The picture in sales and in land deals is, in the beginning,
that of a community whose trade is simple and face to face and
whose traders are neighbors. The goods and the land were there
to be seen during the negotiation and particularly in the case of land,
everybody knew everybody's land; if not, trade was an arm's length
proposition with wits matched against skill. Of course caveat emptor
would be the rule in such a society. But caveat emptor was more
than a rule of no liability; it was a philosophy that left each indi-
vidual to his own devices with a minimum of public imposition of
standards of fair practice." In the beginning the common law did
grant relief from fraud and did recognize that if the seller made
an express promise as to his product at the time of the sale he
remained liable after the sale on this "collateral" promise2 Indeed
covenants for title in the deed were such collateral promises which
survived the sale.
We all know the development that occurred in sales law.-0 In
5. Since the investigation referred to in note 1 supra, the Veterans
Administration in the New Jersey District and perhaps others require as a
condition of approval of the housing for Veteran's loans that the builder give
a guaranty of the roof and basement. See Veterans Administration Newark
Regional Office, Loan Guaranty Issue No. 121, February 25, 1952.
6. For a description of this industrialization see Colean, American
Housing, chs. 3, 4 and 5 (Twentieth Century Fund 1944).
7. See Llewellyn, Cases on Sales 204 (1930) ; Llewellyn, On Warranty
of Quality, and Society, 36 Col. L. Rev. 699 (1936) ; Hamilton, The Ancient
Maxim Caveat Enptor, 40 Yale L. J. 1133 (1931) ; Marrow, Warranty of
Quality: A Comparative Survey, 14 Tul. L. Rev. 327 (1940).
8. See Marrow, supra note 7; Hamilton, supra note 7.
9. 1 Williston, Sales §§ 195, 196, 197 (Rev. Ed. 1948).
10. 1 Williston, Sales §§ 195-203, 223-226, 227-257 (Rev. Ed. 1948).
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sales the requirement of a formal "I warrant" became any promis-
sory words and then any affirmation;" the requirement of words
evidencing an intention to warrant became a requirement that the
words be taken as a statement of fact and not of opinion. Then
almost any statement about goods became a statement of fact and
not of opinion; mere description of goods became warranty of
quality.-' Where reliance was still important the natural tendency
of the words to induce a sale became proof of reliance. Finally
professional sellers were treated as if they had represented their
goods to be merchantable and of fair average quality except where
the buyer had not relied on the seller for determination of this fact.1
3
In land law the change has not been as rapid or as evident, nor
has there been as much need for change. Mass production is just
coming in housing. Even today the great bulk of the housing sold
is "second-hand" housing there to be seen during the dicker.
Formerly new housing was not purchased; rather there was a
contract to construct it on the home owner's lot according to his
own plans and specifications. And it has always been clear that a
construction contract as distinguished from a sales contract carried
with it promises to perform in a workman-like manner.1 4 Further-
more many restrictions on use which could not be seen were treated
as obligations of the seller within his obligation of title and there-
fore not within the rule of caveat emptor.
The new development in house marketing is the growth of a
contract to sell a house and land from a description and sample or
"show house." It is in this area that we may expect the first growth
or development of the law, and significantly it is this area that has
produced the recent cases and public agitation.
Now let us consider the rules of law which are available to
determine a vendor's obligation as to quality and fitness for use.
1. Where quality or fitness is a part of title. A vendor is obli-
gated, absent agreement otherwise, to furnish the purchaser with
a marketable title which includes a title free from encumbrances."5
Caveat emptor does not apply while the contract is executory.
Absent fraud or mutual mistake however this obligation is treated
as satisfied or merged in the deed and on acceptance of the deed
the purchaser has no right with respect to a defective title except
11. Uniform Sales Act § 12.
12. Uniform Sales Act § 14.
13. Uniform Sales Act § 15.
14. Hudson, Building Contracts 186 (7th ed. 1946).
15. Patton, Titles § 30 (1938) ; 3 Am. L. of Prop. § 11A7 (1952).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
insofar as he obtained covenant for title in his deed.-" Restrictions
on use of property found in defeasible estates, 17 and in covenants
and equitable servitudes' and because of the existence of ease-
ments' -9 are instances where matters of quality and fitness are also
matters of title as is also an encroachment of the subject property
on the property of others and of other property on the subject
property.20 Are all easements and covenants "encumbrances ?" What
about those which are apparent and known to or discoverable by
the purchaser on inspection before contracting? While it is always
said that the buyer's knowledge of an encumbrance such as a mort-
gage is not material to the scope of the seller's obligations, -1 there is
some confusion and conflict as to the effect of buyer's knowledge or
inspection upon those encumbrances which relate to or affect the
physical conditions upon the realty.22 It has been held, for example,
that an easement such as a public utility right of way which ob-
viously and notoriously affects the physical conditions of the land
at the time of sale is not an encumbrance 2 but other authorities have
vigorously rejected this rule.
24
In sales law this same problem is presented where there are
obvious defects in the goods and yet the seller makes a warranty
in terms broad enough to warrant against the obvious defect. There
the problem has been treated as one of construction-whether a
warranty in general terms is to be construed to cover obvious
defectsY.
2
The conflict about such open and notorious easements suggests
that the quality aspects of the matter are more crucial in judicial
thinking than the title aspects. For if the matter were treated as
one of quality then the emphasis would be on the importance of
the defect and its obviousness. In England, it is asserted that such
"physical" or quality defects are matters of title if the defect is
16. Williston, Contracts § 723 (1936). See Note, 84 A. L. R. 1008,
(1933).
17. Patton, Titles § 334 (1938).
18. Id. at § 350.-
19. Id. at § 344.
20. Id. at § 368.
21. Rawle, Covenants 112 (5th ed. 1887).
22. See Note, 64 A. L. R. 1479 (1929); First Unitarian Society v.
Citizens Say. & Trust Co., 162 Ia. 389, 153 N. W. 87 (1913); Patton, op.
cit. su pra note 17, § 367.
23. Patton, op. cit. supra note 17, § 367.
24. See the dissent and citations in First Unitarian Society v. Citizens
Say. & Trust Co., 162 Ia. 389, 153 N. W. 87 (1913).
25. 1 Williston, Sales § 207 (rev. ed. 1948).
26. Cobby, Is the Perinitted Use a Matter of Title 13 (N.S.) Cony.
& Prop. Lawyer 329 (1949).
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both material and latent .2  Since an implied warranty of quality
would impose liability only if the defect was material and latent it
seems unnecessary to add the additional step in the reasoning
by first saying material and latent defects are matters of title and
thus within the title rule. English law says a defect is not material
if it does not prevent the property from being substantially the
same as that which the purchaser thought he was getting according
to the description and inspection of the property.2 7 This reasoning
resembles the warranty of merchantability. It seems to say that if
the purchaser gets substantially what he would get on the purchase
of any property in the neighborhood he is getting the quality bar-
gained for.
Another set of problems illustrating the difficulty of correlating
obligations as to title with obligations as to physical conditions of
the land is that of building codes and zoning ordinances. While
zoning restrictions have almost identical impact on land use as re-
strictive covenants they are generally held not to be encumbrances
on the title.28 It is only when an element of frustration of purpose
is present that it may be said a vendor has obligations as to per-
mitted use under a municipal ordinance.20 Thus a lessee under a
lease limiting his privileged use to one prohibited by the zoning
ordinance may be excused where a zoning ordinance enacted be-
tween the time of signing the contract and date of closing effectively
prevents the purchaser from getting the use for which he bargained. 30
On the other hand even though the ordinance itself is not an
encumbrance and even though a building restriction is excepted
from the seller's title obligation by an express term in the con-
tract, it seems that a violation of such an ordinance or restriction
is a defect in title and entitles the purchaser to treat the seller as in
breach.' Title is said to be unmarketable in a way not excepted
from the contract because the seller is clearly attempting to force
a "law suit" on the buyer. Furthermore many of these building codes
27. Id. at 330.
28. Anderson v. Steinway & Sons, 178 App. Div. 507, 165 N. Y. Supp.
608, aff'd, 221 N. Y. 639, 117 N. E. 575 (1917) ; Lincoln Trust Co. v.
Williams Building Corp., 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E. 209 (1920) ; see Patton,
Titles 1038 (1938) (and cases cited therein).
29. Hyland v. Parkside Ins. Co., 10 N. J. Misc. 1148, 162 A. 521
(1932).
30. Anderson v. Steinway & Sons, 178 App. Div. 507, 165 N. Y. S. 608,
aff'd, 221 N. Y. 639, 117 N. E. 575 (1917) ; cf. Beggs v. Steinway & Sons, 229
N. Y. 320, 128 N. E. 211 (1920).
31 Lohmeyer v. Bower, 170 Kan. 442, 227 P. 2d 102 (1951) ; 66 C. J.
911, 912 § 590; 3 Am. L. of Prop. § 11.49 n. 92 (1952). But cf. Woodenbury v.
Spier, 122 App. Div. 396, 106 N. Y. Supp. 817 (2d Dept. 1907) where a viola-
tion of a building code was held not to be an encumbrance.
19531
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and zoning ordinances provide that a violation is a "nuisance"'3 2 and
it would seem clear that the existence of a nuisance is an encum-
brance. 33
The conclusion that a zoning ordinance is not an encumbrance
but that a violation of that same ordinance is, presents some
analytical difficulties if a "title" analysis is used but none at all on
the sales analogy. It is easy to see that a seller could be said
to warrant that the present condition of the premises are legal
because the ordinance establishes the minimum quality standards
for the community and to that extent he warrants that the premises
are reasonably "fit" for the present use; on the other hand he makes
no warranty as to possible future uses.
Summarizing the cases where matters of the physical condition
of the premises are matters of title: the cases by in large put the
seller in the position of warranting that the property is substantially
the same as that which the plaintiff thought he was getting according
to the description coupled with an inspection of the property and
that the present use is that generally permitted in the area by the
municipal ordinances. Latent defects of quality, if a matter of title,
are actionable, however.
2. Vendor's obligation as to physical condition of the premises
where quality and fitness are not a matter of title. Non-title ques-
tions as to a vendor's obligation as to fitness of the premises be-
tween time of contracting and time of closing arise: (a) by reason of
express warranties of vendor including warranties arising by rea-
son of description or of sale from a sample or model; and (b)
by reason of warranties or obligations implied by rule of law.
(a).T7end6r's liability for deterioration of premises between
time of contracting and thne of closing. Whether or not the vendor
has any obligation as to the condition of the premises at the time
of contracting, the contract time fixes a condition of the premises to
which the purchaser is entitled at closing except as a worsened
condition results normally from the vendor's right of possession
until closing. Hence the vendor is clearly obligated to the purchaser
for deterioration in the condition resulting from voluntary waste
by the vendor. While there has been little litigation on permissive
32. N. Y. Multiple Dwelling Law § 4 (30) ; Building Code of Chicago
(1951) §§ 39-7; 90-4.
33. In Pharm v. Letuchy, 283 N. Y. 130, 27 N. E. 2d 811 (1940) a
vendor was held liable for personal injuries sustained by a tenant of the
premises after the conveyance on the theory that the statute made violations
of the building code a nuisance and liability for nuisance survives the
conveyance. See also Prosser, Torts 645 (1941).
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waste by a vendor in this country, the English cases and the theory
of what few U. S. cases there are support the conclusion that the
vendor also is liable for permissive waste.34 While the obligation is
deducible from the theory of equitable conversion, the same result
is obtainable by an interpretation of the contract-the contract obli-
gates the seller to deliver the property to the buyer in the condition
in which it was at the time of contracting, reasonable wear and tear
and possibly loss from casualtyr excepted.
(b). Express warranties. It is, of course, axiomatic that if the
vendor makes express promises or affirmations as to the condition
of the premises sold, the vendor has obligations as to the fitness of
the premises. However inquiry must be directed to (1) the words or
circumstances sufficient to create the express representation or
warranty; (2) the scope of the obligation assumed; and (3) the
purchaser's remedy.
What words and facts are sufficient to create a warranty? In
the 17th century sales law answered "none" except the words
"warrant" or "guarantee." But the courts have been receding from
the rigid formalism of Chandelor v. Lops" so that today, in sales
law at least, no formal words of warranty are required. If it is
the hope of the National Association of Home Builders to avoid the
existence of a warranty by changing the name of the paper given
to the purchaser from "warranty" to "policy" then they have more
faith in the formalism of land law than I have.3 7 Is there any
order of time with reference to the time of contracting when the
words of warranty must be expressed? This is important because it
is my understanding that the National Association of Home Build-
ers paper frequently is signed and given to the purchaser at closing
and not at the signing of the contract. If one of the essential fea-
tures in warranty is reliance on the seller's statements there should
be no difficulty with statements made before the bargain. For state-
ment made after the bargain it is obvious that there is going to
be technical difficulty in establishing consideration or detrimental
34. Royal Bristol Permanent Bldg. Society v. Bomash, 35 Ch. Div.
390 (1885). Contra: Hellriegel v. Manning, 97 N. Y. 56 (1884). See Note,
The Vendor's Liability for Permissive Waste, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 821 (1935).
35. As to risk of loss from casualty see Note, 5 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 260
(1938); N. Y. L. Rev. Comm. Leg. Doc. No. 65M (1936); Vanneman,
Risk of Loss in Equity Between the Date of Contract to Sell Real Estate and
Transfer of Title, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 127 (1923) ; Uniform Vendor and Pur-
chaser Risk Act.
36. Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Repr. 3 (1603).
37. See notes 2 and 5 supra for wording of the "warranty" and "policy."
1953]
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reliance.28 If the buyer was entitled to reject the performance ten-
dered at the closing or if he claimed the right in good faith, consider-
ation for the later express warranty could be spelled out of an in-
ducement to him to forbear exercise of the right to terminate. In
states which allow written modification of contrasts without con-
sideration3" there should be no difficulty in spelling a modification
out of the later written statements. It has been held in sales that a
warranty given at any time before title has passed is effective and
while there may be some technical difficulty with these cases they do
indicate that the important question is whether the language is part
of the bargain.40
Must the seller have a specific intention to warrant? It may
be that the use of "policy" instead of "warrant" in the latest Na-
tional Association of Home Builders form is to negate an intention
to warrant. The English sales cases do hold that "intention" to
warranty is essential41 and some of the earlier American sales
cases reached the same result.42 The better sales cases and the Uni-
form Sales Act now reject this requirement and concentrate atten-
tion on the question whether the statement is merely a matter of
opinion or an affirmation of fact.43 Thus a statement by a lessor
that an apartment was "in first class shape" was held to be a
matter of opinion or trade puffing.44
Modern sales law treats the description of goods as an express
warranty that the goods conform to the description. 4' Land law
seems to have a similar rule where the description fixes what was
bargained for. Thus a statement of quantity in the description is a
representation that the legally described parcel contains that
38. This difficulty would not arise even if the warranty is not given
until closing if representations concerning it were made in advertisements
and sales promotions.
39. See N. Y. Real Prop. Law § 279.
40. 1 Williston, Sales § 211 (Rev, Ed. 1948).
41. Heibutt v. Buckleton, [1913) A.C. 30; 1 Williston, Sales § 198
(Rev. Ed. 1948). DeLaSalle v. Guildford [1901] 2 K.B. 215 which Williston
said represented the contrary view until the House of Lords spoke in the
Heilbutt case is a land case and is still cited as good authority in land cases.
See Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B. 113.
42. See, e.g., 11cFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55, 34 Am. Dec. 497
(Pa. 1839). This case was cited with approval in Illinois as late as 1921,
Van Horn v. Stautz, 297 Ill. 530, 131 N. E. 153 (1921).
43. 1 Williston, Sales §§ 199-201 (Rev. Ed. 1948).
44. Stovall v. Newell, 158 Ore. 206, 75 P. 2d 346 (1938).
45. 1 Williston, Sales § 223 (Rev. Ed. 1948). Although it is said to be
more customary to describe the warranty as an "implied warranty," the
early cases and the proposed Uniform Commercial Code (§ 2-313) call the
warranty an express warranty.
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quantity ;48 a contract selling "40 acres, 20 of which are arable," or
"40 acres of timber land" is a representation that the land con-
forms to the description 4 7 Likewise a contract to sell a "lot and
house" should be a representation that a house exists on the lot.
Another sales law example of an express warranty is the war-
ranty arising from a sample or model, that the goods shall con-
form to the sample or model. The applicability of this doctrine to
land law is of particular importance today because of the current
merchandising practice of the developer opening a "show house" for
inspection and selling the other houses from this model and plans
and pictures. Of course this transaction could be treated as a
contract to sell a lot plus a contract to build a house and it would be
obvious that there is in the latter contract a promise that the work
should be done in a workmanlike manner and with proper and suit-
able materials. It also seems clear that even if treated as a sale and
not a construction contract there is a warranty that the house will
conform to the sample and will be free from any defects rendering
the house uninhabitable which would not be apparent on reasonable
examination of the sample.
48
Some of the cases have put this obligation on the seller as an
implied obligation and as an exception to the rule of caveat emptor
(discussed in next section) because of the absence of a chance of
inspection. It seems better to treat this as an obligation of the con-
tract however because in some of the cases liability has been im-
posed for defects which it was easier to discover because the house
was not complete and such liability has been imposed even where
the buyer examined the uncompleted house.49 This obligation of the
seller is also better treated as an express warranty because the
cases make clear that the obligation cannot be modified or elimi-
nated (as can an implied warranty) by general words disclaiming
it.ro
46. 2 Warvelle, Vendor and Purchaser 839 (1890).
47. Cf.. Woodvard v. Western Canada Colonization Co., 34 Minn. 8, 158
N. W. 706 (1916).
48. Stevens v. Milestone, 190 Md. 61, 57 A. 2d 292 (1948); Laurel
Realty Co. v. Himelfarb, 191 Md. 462, 62 A. 2d 263 (1948), 72 A. 2d 23
(1950) ; Greenfield v. Liberty Construction Corp., 81 N. Y. S. 2d 550 (Sup.
Ct. 1948); Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B. 113. Note,
New Houses and Tfarranties, 85 L. J. 219 (1938) (and cases cited). There is
a similar obligation on the lessor when he leases uncompleted accommoda-
tions. Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S. W. 2d 460 (Te-x. Civ. App. 1930).
49. See Laurel Realty Co. v. Himelfarb, 191 Md. 462, 62 A. 2d 263
(1948), 72 A. 2d 23 (1950).
50. See, e.g., Cordua Y. Guggenheim, 274 N. Y. 51, 59, 8 N. E. 2d 274
(1937).
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(c). Implied obligations as to condition of the premises. It is
usually said that except for a few exceptions to be discussed pres-
ently there are no implied warranties in the sale or lease of land. 1 In
sales law on the other hand there are two implied warranties: (a)
a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose where the buyer
makes this special purpose known to the seller and it appears that
the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment that the goods
will be reasonably fit for such purpose ;52 and (b) a warranty of
merchantability including a warranty of fitness for ordinary purpose
where goods are bought from a seller who deals in goods of that
type.53 Neither warranty is available to the buyer if he has examined
the goods and if the defect is of the type which such examination
ought to have revealed to him.
54
In a contract to sell unascertained goods or unspecified goods
it may not be necessary to "imply" a warranty because a fair inter-
pretation of the contract to sell goods of a certain description may
include the obligation as to the quality of the goods. In a contract
to sell specific goods sales law also started where land law is alleged
to be today-no implied warranties. Today with or without the sales
act most jurisdictions conclude that the circumstances of the normal
bargain with a merchant justify the buyer in believing that the seller
represents the goods to be merchantable and also justify the buyer
in relying on this representation.?5
While land law is said to have the rule of caveat emptor in its
broadest application, it should be noted that in many land law
situations the rule of no liability on the seller would have obtained
even if the sales law rule of implied warranties were followed. In
the sale of second hand goods there are many less warranties than
in the sale of new goods and if usage of trade imposes none there
are none. The bulk of the land sold includes used buildings rather
than new buildings, and furthermore in the sale of second hand
housing the seller is often so clearly not a merchant or specially
skilled seller that the buyer is not entitled to rely on the seller's
51. The leading case is Hart v. Windsor, 12 M. & W. 68, 152 Eng.
Repr. 1114 (Ex. 1843). See also Combow v. Kansas City Ground Invest-
ment Co., 358 Mo. 934, 218 S. W. 2d 539, 8 A. L. R. 2d 213 (1949). 2 Wil-
liams, Vendor and Purchaser 680 (1906) ; Williston, Contracts § 926 (rev. ed.
1936).
52. Uniform Sales Act § 15(1).
53. Uniform Sales Act, § 15(2).
54. Uniform Sales Act, § 15(3).
55. 1 Williston, Sales § 231 (rev. ed. 1948).
56. However the sale is often made through a skilled agent and his
skill may be attributed to the seller.
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special skill or judgment. The sales law rule of implied warranty
would impose no warranties in these situations56 The customary in-
spection by the buyer in land deals would prevent the imposition
of a warranty even under sales law rules because of the usage
of the trade.
Finally there is more difficulty in establishing a standard of fit-
ness for ordinary purposes in land cases. Some of the land cases have
pointed out that there is no warranty of inhabitability because the
purchaser may be purchasing to demolish or remodel the existing
structure but these same corts have found an implied warranty of
habitability in housing under construction because, it is said, such
a contract indicates that both parties know the purpose for which
the land is being purchased.5 7 If this is the basis of the house under
construction exception to the rule of caveat emptor then there
ought to be an implied warranty of habitability in new housing com-
pleted shortly before contractG8 and in old housing where the land
use is restricted by private covenant or zoning to residential uses. 59
There is more difficulty in establishing a standard of fitness
for ordinary purposes in land than in goods because of the multi-
tude of uses to which land can be put and because of the multitude
of buyer's standards of livability. It is obvious that no one could
see in a sale of farm land any warranty of fitness for timber land;
yef timber land use is one of the ordinary uses of land. Inspection
would probably disclose this defect in any event. But even in housing
there are vastly different standards of living conditions sought and
the tradition of remodeling imposes obstacles in the way of finding
a fair objective standard for the warranty. For example, in the sale
of second-hand housing the buyer may buy intending to convert the
coal furnace into gas or oil heat and may not care whether the
existing coal furnace operates or not. The requirement of reliance
could handle most of these situations.
The main exceptions to the rule of caveat emptor in land cases
are: (1) with respect to buildings sold or leased during the course
of construction ;O0 (2) with respect to latent defects known to the
vendor or lessor;"' (3) with respect to premises used for the pur-
57. Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd. [1931] 2 K.B. 113.
58. In England on the sale of a completed new house there was held
to be no warranty, Haskins v. Vvroodham, [1938] 1 All E. R. 692; cf.
Combow v. Kansas City Ground Investment Co., 358 Mo. 934, 218 S. W. 2d
539, 8 A. L. R. 2d 213 (1949) (no warranty in a remodeled house).
59. Cf. Hyland v. Parkside Ins. Co., 10 N. J. Misc. 148, 162 A. 521
(1932).
60. See note 48 supra.
61. See Restatement, Torts §§ 353, 358 (1934).
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pose of public admission ;62 and (4) the exception with respect to
those parts of the premises remaining under the control of the
lessor. 63 The first two are said to be applicable both to sales of a
fee and sales or leases of a term; the fourth is applicable only to
leases; and the third is usually discussed with respect to a lessor's
liability. - -I
If the policy of the caveat emptor rule is sound the reason or
reasons for these exceptions and their limits are not easy of state-
ment. The first exception with respect to buildings under construc-
tion has been justified by reason of the absence of an opportunity
for the lessee or purchaser to inspect.64 If a vendor is to be liable
when the purchaser is unable to protect himself by inspection, then
the second exception with its limitation seems too narrow. The
purchaser is just as unable to discover the latent defect not known
to the vendor as he is one known to the vendor. Actually the authori-
ty for the limitation on the exception is extremely meager and it
comes almost entirely from landlord-tenant cases and not from
vendor-purchaser cases. Early sales law also seemed to have had
this limitation that the defect be known to the seller before liability
was imposed on him.65 In origin it seems clear that the second ex-
ception which developed earliest in point of time was developed out
of fraud liability. It was thought to be something in the nature of
fraud for a vendor or lessor to fail to disclose defects known to
him.c" With the development of the first exception, however, the
reason for the limitation on the second exception becomes less de-
fensible because the first exception is the beginning of an imposi-
tion of liability for at least non-discoverable defects in the condition
of the premises. Sales law, with the rise of the executory contract
(analogous to the contract to sell buildings during construction)
soon discarded the fraud basis of liability for concealed defects and
made fitness or freedom from concealed defects a part of the bargain
or contract whether or not the seller had knowledge of the defects.
Actually in the vendor-purchaser situation the only place this
limitation makes any real difference is with respect to new housing
already completed at the time of the contract to sell. With respect
to buildings under construction, an interpretation of the contract
62. See Prosser, Torts 653 et seq. (1941).
63. Id. at 656.
64. See note 48 stpra; 85 L. J. 219 (1938) ; Young Corp. v. McClintic,
26 S. W. 2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (Lessee must be afforded an oppor-
tunity to judge suitability).
65. See Jones v. Just, L. R. 3 Z. B. (1868).
66. See Prosser, Torts 645 (1941).
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will normally impose on the vendor greater liability, indeed almost
a warranty of fitness for purpose.8 7 With respect to land in which
there are second-hand or used buildings, usage of trade will in
most cases compel the conclusion that the sale was on an "as is"
basis."' There does not seem to be any justification in limiting the
liability of a dealer in new housing to defects known to him at the
time of sale, if he is liable for the same defects in housing which he
sells before completion.
The third exception is a curious one. It operates to impose on
the landlord a duty to see that his premises are in good repair at
the time of leasing if the premises are to be used by the lessee as
a place for public admission such as a theater or wharf. The duty is
clearly owed to the member of the public who is injured and would
seem also to run to the lessee at least to the extent of indemnifying
him for loss suffered because of his own duty as a possessor to the
member of the public. The exception sounds like an implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose-a representation that
premises designed for public admission are safe for such admission.
If stated this way then clearly the lessee has an action against the
lessor and it would seem that a vendee would have a similar action.
In any event the rule imposing liability on a vendor even after
sale for harm resulting from a nuisance on the sold land or from
the existence of an unreasonably dangerous condition would seem
to cover the situation sufficiently to permit the vendee to hold the
vendor in practically all situations where the lessor has been held
liable to the public. 9
But for the limitation in the latent defect exception-that the
vendor have knowledge of the defect, imposition of liability on a
vendor in each of the first three exceptions would be easily under-
standable as an application of a rule of implied warranty of fitness
for ordinary purposes and of the rule of McPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.
70
Is the rule of the McPherson case applicable to impose liability on
suppliers or manufacturers of housing including remodelled hous-
ing? This case imposes on suppliers of chattels tort liability for
failure to exercise reasonable care to make the chattel safe for the
67. See page 111 of text supra.
68. See page 118 of text supra.
69. See Plumer v. Harper, 3 N. H. 88 (1824) ; Pharm v. Letucky, 283
N. Y. 130, 77 N. E. 2d 811 (1940). But cf. Restatement, Torts §§ 374, 375
(1934) where the liability for nuisance is limited to exclude liability for dis-
repair or failure to keep up.
70. 217 N. Y. 382, 11 N. E. 1050 (1916).
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ordinary use for which it was supplied. The main importance of
the doctrine is that it extends a seller's liability to persons other
than the purchaser. The English courts have rejected extension of
the McPherson rule (called the "snail-in-the-bottle" principle in
England) to realty.71 In this country, although the application of
the doctrine to contractors who remodel buildings seems to be
behind the development in the chattel field there seems to be no real
indication that it will not be applied. In Hale v. Depaoli7 2 the de-
fendant lessor constructed the building in which the injured plaintiff
resided. After the construction the building had been sold by the
contractors and was not reacquired by the defendant for some ten
years. The Supreme Court of California held the defendant liable
for an injury suffered because of a defectively constructed railing
on the theory that a building contractor is liable to third persons
for negligent construction. It is said that if knowledge of the defect
was a requirement, that requirement was met by imputing the
carpenters' knowledge that they used nails of improper strength
'to the contractors. The importance of this case for our purpose
is that the defendant was a vendor-contractor apparently in the
development business.
The English court in rejecting the extension of the rule to the
manufacturer of .housing distinguished the chattel cases on the
ground that in the case of chattels there was no opportunity for
intermediate inspection whereas in the sale of housing the purchaser
had an opportunity to inspect. The American cases with respect
to inspection of chattels seem to relieve the manufacturer from
liability only if the purchaser did inspect and did discover the de-
fect; the opportunity of inspection does not relieve the manufac-
turer from his liability. With this approach in the chattel cases
it does not seem likely that the McPherson v. Buick rule will be
limited to chattels and manufacturers of buildings will probably be
held liable equally with manufacturers of chattels.
Purchaser's Remedies. Assuming some obligation is imposed on
the vendor with respect to the condition of the premises, what are
the purchaser's remedies?
Here we must distinguish the executory contract from the situ-
ation after the purchaser has accepted the deed. When the contract
71. Bottomley v. Bannister [1932] 1 K. B. 458 (defective boiler);
M'Alister v. Stevenson [1932] A. C. 562; Otto v. Bolton & Norris [1936]
1 All Eng. 960 (ceiling); Note, 81 L. J. 290 (1936); Note, 82 L. J. 292
(1936).
72. 33 Cal. (2d) 228, 201 P. 2d 1 (1948). See also Colbert v. Holland
Furnace Co., 333 Ill. 78, 164 N. E. 162 (1928).
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is executory the purchaser's remedies include: (a) rejection of
the tendered performance and recovery of any part of the price paid;
(b) rejection of the tendered performance and recovery for dam-
ages for breach of contract; (c) specific performance to compel
full performance; (d) specific performance with compensation for
the defective performance.
The materiality of the breach determines whether the purchaser
may rescind or whether his only recourse is damages for the de-
fect in quality. It should also be noted that where the defect in
quality is also a matter of title, some jurisdictions limit the purchaser
to recission and recovery of the portion of the price paid.
Where the purchaser has accepted the deed and then makes
claim with respect to the condition of the premises, new and im-
portant problems arise. Does acceptance of title prevent the pur-
chaser from rescinding, from recovering damages, or both?
Where the purchaser accepts a deed after he acquires knowledge
of the defect, he clearly loses his right to rescind and this is
also the rule in the sale of goods. Where the defect is not dis-
covered until after acceptance of the deed we get a rule that is
clearly different in phraseology and probably in effect from modem
sales law. As the Restatement of Contracts, Section 413 states the
rule, "acceptance of a deed of conveyance of land . ..discharges
the contractual duties of the seller to the party so accepting" ex-
cept such duties as are "collateral" to the main purposes of the con-
tract. Rescission is also precluded except for fraud or mutual mis-
take. This is clearly different from modem sales law which permits
both rescission and an action for damages after acceptance of the
goods.
' 3
The test of the difference between the land rule and the sales
rule comes in the application of the "collateral" promises exception.
For if all of a seller's obligations as to quality are "collateral" ob-
ligations then the right to damages survives acceptance of the deed.
The test of the Restatement of Contracts is whether the agreement
is one which "might naturally be made as a separate agreement by
parties situated as were the parties to the written agreement."
74 It
is sometimes said that under a land contract the main obligations of
the vendor are: (1) production of documentary evidence sufficient
to establish the validity of his title and (2) execution and delivery
of the deed. It accordingly is clear that as to all obligations of the
73. Uniform Sales Act, §§ 49, 69(3).
74. Restatement, Contracts § 240 comment (1932).
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vendor with respect to title including those matters of title which
are also matters of quality, acceptance of the deed by the buyer
discharges the vendor from any further obligations under the con-
tract even as to title defects thereafter discovered.7 5 But if we apply
this understanding of the main purpose of a land contract to other
warranties as to quality, it would seem that such obligations are
"'collateral" and accordingly do survive acceptance of the deed. Thus
promises to make repairs and improvements, warranties as to
quality of the soil, promises to build according to specifications, and
obligations as to habitability of the premises have been held to sur-
vive acceptance of the deed.76 Indeed, the history of warranties
demonstrates that in origin warranties were always regarded as
"collateral contracts" which survived the executed sale.
The development of any concept of warranties as to fitness in
a land contract seems destined to carry with it further expansion
of the categories of "collateral" contracts which survive acceptance
of the deed. In American sales law the buyer may also rescind after
acceptance of the goods but in English law this is less frequently
the case. Is this doctrine also likely to apply to land contracts? It
would seem to me that land law is more likely to develop along the
English lines-an action for damages or specific performance may
be available to the buyer but not rescission after acceptance of the
deed.
In this paper I have not discussed many important questions, in-
cluding the problems of the measure of damages for breach of war-
ranty of quality; the problem of excluding or modifying warranties
by general "no warranty" clauses in the contract; and the problem
of modifying the remedies by contract so that the buyer may have
only a right that the seller repair the defect. In general these matters
are likely to follow sales law rules and do not need special treatment.
To summarize the answer to the problem of the seller's obliga-
tions as to the condition and fitness of the premises it may be said
that:
75. Cf. Pybus v. Grasso, 317 Mass. 716, 59 N. E. 2d 289 (1945) where
vendor's duty as to encroachment held discharged.
76. Shelby v. C. & E. I. R. R., 143 Ill. 385 (1892) (repairs to dam);
Disbrow v. Harris, 122 N. Y. 362, 25 N. E. 356 (1890) (repairs) ; South
Texas Land Co. v. Sorenson, 199 Ia. 699, 202 N. W. 552 (1925) (improve-
ments) ; Savelle v. Chalmers, 76 Ia. 325, 41 N. W. 30 (1888) (warranty of
quality of soil) ; Edison Realty Co. v. Bauerschub, 191 Md. 451, 62 A. 2d
354 (1948) (warranty by description) ; Lavin v. Cook, 186 Md. 535, 47 A. 2d
505 (1946) (warranty of fitness of heating plant). Cases cited in note 48




(1) To the extent the obligation is a matter of title a contractual
obligation is imposed on the seller but the obligation is discharged
if the purchaser accepts the deed without obtaining covenants in
the deed such as the covenant against encumbrances.
(2) If no matter of title is involved, the sale of an incomplete
building seems to impose on the vendor a duty to make the premises
fit for the ordinary purposes for which the building is being con-
structed and if the sale is from a model there is a duty to make the
building sold conform to the model and to be reasonably fit for its
ordinary purposes. This duty seems to survive acceptance of the
deed.
(3) If the sale is a sale of used housing and of completed new
housing, caveat emptor clearly applies as to all defects in quality
discoverable on inspection. This result would probably be reached
even under sales law rules.
(4) On the sale of completed new housing or of second hand
housing there seems to be no obligation on the seller as to latent
defects in the quality of the land and improvements unless the obli-
gation is one sounding in fraud for concealment of defects known
to the seller. This differs substantially from the sale of goods rule
where the seller is a manufacturer or dealer because in such a situ-
ation the seller is obligated for latent defects in quality whether
or not the seller knows of the defects.
(5) It appears that there is likely to be a development in the
common law toward imposing an obligation of quality on sellers of
new housing. When this occurs the sales and land law rules will
come closer together than they are today. There appears to be no
need for changing the common law rule as to the vendor's obliga-
tion for quality of second-haud housing except perhaps with respect
to apartments where a better solution is the imposition of statutory
obligations on the lessor as to the fitness of the premises.
